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Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, 
we analyze a simple game called the ‘chopstick auction’ in which bidders are confronted with 
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theory and in a laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient 
equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second-price sealed-bid auction in which the 
exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the chopstick 
auction is slightly less efficient but yields far more revenue than the second-price sealed-bid 
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 1 Introduction
Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by what is called the ‘exposure problem’. We
speak of an exposure problem when bidders aim at winning several objects in a multi-
object auction but are exposed to the risk of buying too few as competition on some of
these objects turns out to be tougher than expected.1 Several economists have argued
that the exposure problem in auction should be prevented as it leads (1) to an ine¢cient
outcome of the auction and (2) to low revenue. In this paper, we will investigate whether
these claims are true, both using a game theoretical model and a laboratory experiment.
Economic theory sketches a mixed picture about these two claims. Theoretical papers
of Robert Rosenthal and coauthors include situations in which the exposure problem
is present. Szentes and Rosenthal (2001a, 2001b) …nd e¢cient equilibria in multi-unit
auctions of homogeneous objects. However, Krishna andRosenthal (1996), andRosenthal
and Wang (1996) construct ine¢cient equilibria in the case of heterogeneous objects. In
these papers, they analyze multi-unit auctions with two types of bidders, namely ‘local
bidders’ who are interested in only one object, and ‘global’ bidders who try to acquire
several. The global bidders, in competition with the local ones, face the exposure problem
when attempting to realize synergies between the objects. In line with this, Bykowsky
et al. (1998) give an illustrative example in which the equilibrium outcome is such that
either the allocation is ine¢cient or at least one of the bidders ends up paying more for
the purchased items than they are worth to her.
Other theorists have investigated the relationship between e¢ciency and revenue.
Ausubel and Cramton (1998, 1999) stress the importance of e¢ciency of the auction out-
come in terms of revenues for the seller in auctions of perfectly divisible objects. Ausubel
and Cramton (1999) show that e¢ciency of the auction outcome is necessary for revenue
maximization when the auction is followed by a perfect resale market and when the seller
cannot commit to not selling some objects. However, usually there is a trade-o¤ between
e¢ciency and revenue. In Myerson’s (1981) model, the seller maximizes his expected
revenue by imposing a reserve price and hence excluding bidders with low values from
winning the object. Milgrom (2000) constructs an example in which there is a trade-o¤
1See also Bykowsky et al. (2000), and Milgrom (2000).
2between e¢ciency and revenue in the case of multi-unit auctions: the seller realizes a less
e¢cient outcome when using larger packages but gets a higher revenue.
In practice, it is also not clear whether the exposure problem is a major issue. At least
Klemperer (2001) does not include the warning ‘avoid the exposure problem’ in his list of
issues that are of practical importance in the design of (multi-unit) auctions. However,
Van Damme (2000) claims that the exposure problem lead to low bids and an ine¢cient
outcome in the Dutch DCS-1800 auction. In February 1998, the Dutch government auc-
tioned licenses for second generation mobile telecommunication using an auction with
almost the same rules as the FCC auctions in the US.2 A di¤erence between the Dutch
DCS-1800 auction and the American auctions was that in the American auctions, the ex-
posure problem was not seriously present as bidders were allowed to withdraw there bids.
Van Damme argues that the FCC auction format would have lead to a higher revenue
and a more e¢cient outcome.
Does the exposure problem indeed lead to ine¢cient outcomes and low revenues?
In order to answer this question, we confronted subjects with a simple auction game
called ‘the chopstick auction’ (CSA).3 In this auction, a seller simultaneously sells three
chopsticks. There are 2 bidders in the auction, who independently submit a bid, which
is the price for one chopstick. Call the second highest bid p. The outcome of CSA is
such that the highest bidder gets two chopsticks for a price of 2p and the second highest
bidder gets one chopstick for p. We compared CSA with the second-price sealed-bid
auction in which two chopsticks are sold as one bundle (SPSB). The only di¤erence with
the ‘usual’ second-price sealed-bid auction is that the winning bidder has to pay his bid
twice, once for each chopstick. We investigated bidding behavior in CSA and in SPSB in
the following setting. Bidder i’s (i = 1;2) marginal values are zero on the …rst chopstick,
vi on second, and zero on the third. The signals vi’s are drawn independently from the
same distribution function. As the second highest bidder wins a worthless chopstick for
a positive price, bidders face the exposure problem in CSA.
2See McMillan (1994), Cramton (1995, 1998), McAfee and McMillan (1996), and Milgrom (2000) for
descriptions and discussions of these auctions.
3The credit for the name of this auction game goes to Mary Lucking-Reiley. Thanks to Balasz Szentes
and Robert Rosenthal for pointing this out to us.
3A game closely related to CSA is the dollar auction. In the dollar auction, two bidders
play anascending auction in order to win$1. The highest bidder wins the dollar, but both
bidders pay the price at which the second highest bidder decided to step out. Note that
the exposure problem is present here: the second highest bidder pays a positive price, and
gets nothing. In equilibrium, bidders play a mixed strategy in which both independently
pick a price level at which they leave the auction. This price level follows an exponential
distribution with mean 1. The expected revenue for the seller of the dollar is exactly one
dollar. However, when Shubik (1971) and others confronted subjects with this game in
the lab, the average revenue was signi…cantly larger than $1.
There are two main di¤erences between Shubik’s experiment and ours. First, subjects
in the dollar auction are completely informed about the value of the auctioned object
(which is $1 for both bidders), whereas in our experiment, subjects are only incompletely
informedabout thevalue oftheotherbidder. Moreover, thewinner inShubik’s experiment
pays the same amount as the loser, whereas in CSA, the winner pays twice the loser’s bid.
In this paper, we study CSA in a laboratory experiment and confront the outcomes
with theoretical predictions. In section 2, we will give theoretical properties of CSA
and SPSB in terms of equilibrium behavior and expected revenue.4 Assuming that both
bidders are risk neutral and drawtheir value vi from a uniform distribution on [0;100], we
…nd that CSA has an e¢cient Bayesian Nash equilibrium. From standard auction theory,
we learn that SPSB has an e¢cient equilibrium in dominant strategies in which each
bidder submits a bid equal to half her value for each chopstick. The revenue equivalence
theorem (Myerson, 1981) then implies that CSA is revenue equivalent with SPSB. In
other words, in this theoretical setting, auctions in which the exposure problem is present
perform as well as auctions in which it is not. That makes this setting a useful benchmark
to test the two claims we started with.
In section 3, we describe the experimental design and present the results of the ex-
periment. Our …rst result is the striking di¤erence between the obtained revenue in CSA
and SPSB. In line with the outcomes of the dollar auction, revenue tends to be higher
when bidders are confronted with the exposure problem than if they are not. Our second
4See Onderstal (2002) for a more detailed theoretical investigation of the chopstick auction.
4…nding is that there is a signi…cant but small di¤erence between the e¢ciency of CSA and
of SPSB. Both auctions turn out to be reasonable e¢cient. Although we observe some
learning during the experiment, these results seem to be robust.
The third outcome may seem somewhat surprising: in SPSB, the average revenue
was about 20% above the theoretical outcome assuming that the bidders play a weakly
dominant strategy, i.e., bidding half her value. This …nding is in contrast to what is found
in experiments by Kagel et al. (1987), Kagel and Levin (1993), and Harstad (2000) on
the ‘standard’ second-price sealed-bid auction. In these experiments, the average revenue
was only about 10% above the dominant strategy.5 A possible explanation of this result
is that we have complicated the game somewhat: when winning, a bidder has to pay twice
the second highest bid, once for each chopstick. This is di¤erent than what happens in
the usual second-price sealed-bid auction, in which the winner pays the secondhighest bid
only once. This framing e¤ect shows that even a slight complication of the environment
may make it harder for people to act rationally.
We conclude that our experiment does not give a convincing reason why the warning
‘avoid the exposure problem’ should be added to Klemperer’s list of practical issues in the
design of auctions. CSA is virtually as e¢ciency as SPSB and turns out to yield much
more revenue.
2 Theory
Consider a situation with 2 bidders, labeled 1 and 2, who wish to eat Chinese food.
However, none of the bidders has anything to eat with. Suppose that a seller sells 3
chopsticks in the chopstick auction (CSA) which has the following rules. The price starts
at zero and is continuously raised. Bidders have the opportunity to quit the auction at
any price they desire. The auction ends when one bidder quits. She wins one chopstick
and pays the price at which she quits. The remaining bidder wins two chopsticks and
5See Kagel (1995) for an overview of laboratory experiments on the second-price sealed-bid auction.
5pays two times the price at which the second highest bidder quits.6






s = 0;1, (1)
where vi is a private signal for bidder i. In words, a bidder attaches a value of vi to
winning two chopsticks and no value to winning only one chopstick or to winning a third
one. We assume that the vi’s are drawn independently from a uniform distribution on the
interval [0;100].
Each bidder is a risk neutral expected utility maximizer. Suppose that the price









Proposition 1 gives equilibrium bidding in CSA. By a standard argument, this bid
function must be strictly increasing and continuous. Let U(v;w) be the utility for a
bidder with signal v who behaves as if she has signal w, whereas the other bidders play




at w = v. From this condition, a di¤erential equation is derived, from which the equilib-
rium bid function is uniquely determined.
Proposition 1 Let B(v), the bid of a bidder with signal v, be given by
B (v) = v +[100 ¡ v][log(100¡ v) ¡log100].
Then B is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of CSA. The outcome of the auction
is e¢cient. The bidder with the lowest possible value obtains zero utility.
6In this auction, ties are broken as follows. When a tie takes place at a price of p, a fair coin is tossed.
If tails comes up, the bidder with the lowest label wins two chopsticks for a price of 2p, and the other
bidder wins one chopstick for a price of p. If heads come up, the outcome is reversed.
6Proof. See the appendix.
Let us compare the outcomes of CSAwith the second-price sealed-bidauctioninwhich
two chopsticks are sold as one bundle (SPSB). The only di¤erence with the ‘usual’ second-
price sealed-bid auction is that the winning bidder has to pay his bid twice, once for each
chopstick. Proposition 2 gives the equilibrium properties of SPSB.





Then b is the unique symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies
of SPSB. The outcome of the auction is e¢cient. The bidder with the lowest possible
value obtains zero utility.
Proof. Standard.
Propositions 1 and 2 show that both auctions are e¢cient. In other words, a seller
who is concerned about e¢ciency is indi¤erent between the two auction type.
Moreover, both auctions turn out to be revenue equivalent, and generate the same
expected utility for the bidders. This is a direct consequence of the revenue equivalence
theorem (Myerson, 1981), using the following two observations. First, CSA is an auction
of a single object, namely a set of two chopsticks. Second, according to Propositions 1 and
2, both auctions are e¢cient and the utility of the bidder with the lowest possible value
is equal to zero. The interpretation is that a risk neutral seller interested in revenue is
indi¤erent between using CSAand SPSB to sell the chopsticks. Proposition 3 summarizes
this …nding, and gives the expected revenue and the expected utility for the bidders.
7Proposition 3 Suppose that biddersplay CSA and SPSB according to the strategies given
in Propositions 1 and 2 respectively. Then for both CSA and SPSB, expected revenue
equals 33
1
3 and ex ante expected utility for a bidder is 16
2
3.
Proof. Expected revenue in SPSB can be calculated as follows. As in equilibrium,
each bidder submits a bid equal to 50% of his value, the winner is the bidder with the
highest value. She pays twice the bid of the lowest bidder. In other words, revenue is
equal to the lowest possible value. Therefore, expected revenue is equal to 33
1
3 as this
is the expectation of the lowest from two numbers independently drawn from a uniform
distribution on the interval [0;100]. The utility for the winner of SPSB equals the value
obtained minus the pricepaid. Theexpectedvalueoftwochopsticks for thewinner is equal
to the maximum of two numbers drawn independently from the uniform distribution on
the interval [0;100], i.e. 662
3. Giventhat he pays 331
3 inexpectation, the winner’s expected
utility equals 331
3. As ex ante both bidders have probability 1
2 to be the winner, ex ante
expected utility for a bidder equals 162
3. CSA yields the same expected revenue and the
same ex ante expected utility for each bidder as SPSB. This follows immediately from
the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson, 1981), as in equilibrium, both auctions are
e¢cient and yield zero expected utility for the bidder with the lowest possible value.
3 Laboratory experiment
We present the results of our laboratory experiment in three parts. In the …rst part, we
describe the experimental design. In the second part, we analyze total revenue generated
by the auctions. In the third part, we focus on e¢ciency.
3.1 Experimental design
In a computerized laboratory experiment, we studied CSA and SPSB in a setting that is
closely related to the theoretical setting.7 The main di¤erences are the following. First
7The experiment has been programmed and conducted with the software Z-tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
8of all, the subjects in the lab were confronted with the one-shot version of CSA. Subjects
did not see the price rise until one of them indicated to leave the auction. Instead,
subjects were asked at which price they would desire to quit. However, the two games
are strategically equivalent, so that we did not expect much di¤erences in the outcomes.8
Secondly, subjects drew their values from a …nite grid between 0 and 100, with 1 as
the smallest step. Our theoretical results have been based on the assumption that bidders
draw their signals from the interval [0,100]. Moreover, subjects could choose prices from
a …nite grid between 0 and 999, with 1 as the smallest step. The theory has been based
on the assumption that bidders can choose their bids from a continuous action space.
However, both grids are su¢ciently …ne to approximate the continuous signal and action
space.
The experiments were conducted at the faculty of economics and social sciences at
Innsbruck University between 15 May and 3 June 2002.9 We conducted four sessions,
each consisting of 24 subjects. We had between-subject treatments. In two sessions, sub-
jects played CSA, and in the other two sessions, subjects were confronted with SPSB. In
all sessions, the subjects were separated in groups of four. We ran three practice periods,
followed by 40 paid trading periods. Before the start of each period, the subjects were
randomly re-matched to an opponent in their group of four resulting in 12 independent
observations per treatment. In each period, all subjects drew a new value for two chop-
sticks. At the beginning of each session, subjects read the instructions (see the appendix).
Questions were answered privately.
Subjects were paid a lump sum transfer (5 euros) for showing up and an additional
reward which depended on their average gains in the auctions. They earned points which
were calculated as the di¤erence between the value of the chopsticks they won minus the
price they paid. Points were exchanged into cash according to the exchange rate
100 points = 3 Euro.
8Still, we should be somewhat cautious, as ‘framing e¤ects’ may occur. For instance, in experiments
by Coppinger et al. (1980) and Cox et al. (1982), the …rst-price sealed-bid auction turned out to generate
higher prices than the Dutch auction, despite the fact that both games are strategically equivalent.
9Weconducted a test-experiment at the BEAUTY2001 summer school at the University of Amsterdam.
We took the point earnings from this experiment as guideline how to choose the lump-sum payment and
the rate according to which points are exchanged.
9In CSA, the winner of just one chopsticks gets a negative score equal to the amount he
paid for it. The maximum score in a period is 100 points, i.e., the maximum value (100)
minus the minimum payment (0). If subjects played according to the bidding strategies
in Propositions 1 and 2, they would have earned 25 euros on average.10 The experiments
lasted about 45 minutes, so that the subjects could earn a salient amount of money.
Paying every period as we did induces behavior towards risk neutrality. Paying according
to a randomly selecting one period, instead, may increase subjects’ willingness to take
risks (Davis and Holt, 1993).
3.2 Results: revenue
What is the average revenue in the auctions? In CSA, revenue equals three times the
price: the winner of two chopsticks pays this price twice, the winner of one chopstick
once. In SPSB, revenue is equal to twice the price. See …gure 1 for the average revenue
in each period.
Figure 1: Revenue in CSA and SPSB.
Subjects turned out to bid much more in CSA than predicted by the theory. Proposi-
tion 3 predicts that the average revenue is 331
3 points per period. In reality, the average
revenue was 68 points. As a consequence, the average payments to a subject was very low,
10The calculation is as follows. According to Proposition 3, subjects earn on average 16 2
3 points per
period. Given than they play 40 periods, and the exchange rate of 100 points = 3 Euro, they expect to
earn 162
3 ¤40¤ 3
100 = 20 Euro. Add to this number the 5 Euro lump sum transfer in order to end up with
25 Euro.
10i.e., about 60 eurocents. Of course, it could be that the subjects experienced di¢culties
in understanding the auction. We tested for this by making statistical comparisons sepa-
rately for the …rst and last 20 periods in order to account for learning e¤ects. We found
some learning in the sense that the average payment in the last 20 periods was lower that
in the …rst 20. However, it is still much higher that 331
3.
Result 1 CSA yields more revenue than predicted by the theory.
Also for SPSB, the theory predicts that revenue equals 331
3 points on average per
period. In the experiment, average revenue was equal to about 39 points, 20% more than
the theoretical prediction. The subjects earned 19.1 euros on average, which is clearly
less than the 25 euro they could have earned if they had played the weakly dominant
strategy. A substantial subset of the bidders bid more than its value, playing a weakly
dominated strategy. A possible explanation of this result is that we have complicated the
game somewhat: when winning, a bidder has to pay twice the secondhighest bid, once for
each chopstick. This is di¤erent than what happens in the ‘usual’ second-price sealed-bid
auction, in which the winner pays the second highest bid only once. Overbidding in SPSB
may be driven by the framing.
Result 2 SPSB yields more revenue than predicted by the theory.
Our third result is the striking di¤erence between the obtained revenue in CSA and
SPSB. In line with the outcomes of the dollar auction, revenue tends to be higher when
bidders are confronted with the exposure problem than if they are not. A Mann-Whitney
test reveals that the di¤erence in revenue between CSA and SPSB is signi…cant at a 1%
level (p=0.0005). For both CSA and SPSB we observe a trend towards the prediction by
the theory (331
3 for both auctions). In periods 1-20, the average revenue in CSA is 71 and
in SPSB 40. In periods 21-40, we observe 66 for CSA and 38 for SPSB. The di¤erence is
still large and signi…cant at a 1% level for the later periods.
11Result 3 CSA and SPSB are not revenue equivalent: CSA yields much more revenue
than SPSB.
3.3 Results: e¢ciency
E¢ciency is de…ned as follows
E¢ciency =
value of the winning bidder
maxfv1;v2g
.
Figure 2 shows the development of e¢ciency over the periods in both CSA and SPSB.
Figure 2: E¢ciency of CSA and SPSB.
Propositions 1 and 2 predict that both auctions are 100% e¢cient. In a worst case
scenario, if the two chopsticks are assigned using a lottery, expected e¢ciency equals
75%.11 In CSA, we observed an average e¢ciency equal to 91%, which means that
11The calculation for this number is the following. As both bidders are ex ante symmetric, we may
assume without loss of generality, that the lottery always assigns two chopsticks to bidder 1. Expected


























The …rst term in the inner integral refers to the case that bidder 2 has a higher value than bidder 1 (so
that e¢ciency equals v1
v2). In the second term, bidder 1 has the higher value (so that e¢ciency equals 1).
12Result 4 CSA is reasonably e¢cient.
The e¢ciency of CSA is closer to the theoretical prediction of 100% than the outcome
of a lottery.
The same holds true for SPSB in which e¢ciency was 95%. This …nding is probably
explained by the fact that several subjects bid their value instead of half of it. Still,
Result 5 SPSB is reasonably e¢cient.
Using a Mann-Whitney test, we observe that the di¤erence in e¢ciency between CSA
and SPSB is signi…cant at a 5% level (p = 0;0209). Still the di¤erence is not large, so
that we conclude that
Result 6 SPSB is only slightly more e¢cient than CSA.
We have checked whether these results change during the course of the experiment.
This turns out not to be the case. For the …rst 20 periods, we observed 91% e¢ciency in
CSA versus 94% in SPSB. In the …nal 20 periods (periods 21-40) we observe virtually no
di¤erence (91% in CSA and 95% in SPSB). In both the early periods and the late periods,
the di¤erence between CSA and SPSB is signi…cant at a 5% level.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the e¤ect of the exposure problem on bidding behavior
in auctions. In contrast to some theoretical papers and concerns raised by the outcome
of the Dutch DCS-1800 auction, we feel that auction designers do not have to worry
13that the exposure problem leads to low revenue and ine¢ciency. On the contrary: our
experiment has shown that auctions in which the exposure problem is present may yield
far more revenue for the seller than auctions in which it is not. Moreover, the di¤erence
in e¢ciency is rather small.
Does this mean that we recommend governments to design auctions in which the
exposure problem is present? Probably not: especially if large amounts of money are
at stake, bidders are wise enough to hire experts in auction theory who we expect to
convince bidders to correctly take the risks into account associated with the exposure
problem. Still, in the case that a government is not sure about the conditions on the
demand side, it may safely split up supply in small parts. The bidders could sort out
themselves how many small parts they need to obtain su¢cient value. Depending on the
shape of demand, the government may design an auction in which the exposure problem
is present. Our experiment has shown that this need not have a detrimental e¤ect on the
outcome.
What has remained somewhat puzzling to us is the observation that subjects in SPSB
do not play weakly dominant strategies. We conclude that we have touched a broader
topic in experimental economics or even in economics in general: slight complication
of the environment has signi…cant e¤ect on the outcomes. This may be important for
many applications/situations, from the introduction of elaborate pricing schemes to new
currencies like the euro.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let B(v), the bid of a bidder with signal v, be given by
B(v) = v + [100¡ v][log(100¡ v) ¡ log100].
Then B is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium of CSA. The outcome of the auction
is e¢cient.
14Proof. The following observations imply that a symmetric equilibrium bid function
must be strictly increasing. First, a higher-value type of a bidder cannot exit before a
lower-value type of the same bidder would exit. (Suppose the lower type is indi¤erent
between two di¤erent strategies, givingher two di¤erent probabilities of beingthe ultimate
winner of two chopsticks. The higher type then strictly prefers the strategy with the
higher probability to win. Therefore, she will never quit earlier than the lower type.)
Furthermore, there is no range in which the bid function is ‡at. (Suppose there is the bid
function is ‡at at a price level of p. Then each bidder being in the range of signals that
bid p exits the auction with positive probability at p. But if this is the case, then each
bidder strictly prefers staying just a bit longer.)
Let ~ B be a symmetric and strictly increasing equilibrium bid function. If the other
bidder bids according to ~ B, the expected utility of a bidder with signal v who bids as if











The …rst (second) term of the RHS refers to the case that the bidder makes the second
highest (highest) bid.













at w = v. Rearranging terms we …nd














for some C. C must be zero (C must be at least zero, otherwise a bidder with signal 0
submits a negative bid; if C is larger than zero, a bidder with signal 0 submits a strictly
positive bid. As ~ B is (by assumption) strictly increasing, this bidder submits the lowest
bid with probability one, and has to buy one chopstick for a positive price. Clearly, she is
15strictly better o¤bybiddingzero.) Alsothe SOCis ful…lledas sign(
@U(v;w)
@w ) = sign(v¡w).
It is readily checked that B is a solution.
What remains to be checked it that B is strictly increasing. From (3), B is strictly
increasing if and only if B(v) < v for almost all v 2 [0;100]. This is true, as
B(v) = v + [100¡ v][log(100¡ v) ¡ log100]
< v
for all v 2 (0;100). As B is strictly increasing, CSA is e¢cient.
5.2 Instructions for the experiment
Original Instructions were in German. These are instructions for
treatment CSA.
General information for participants
You are taking part in an economics experiment funded by the Jubilaeumsfonds der
Oesterreichischen Nationalbank. The purpose of the experiment is to analyze decision
behavior in markets.
You will receive 5 Euro for showing up. If you carefully read the instructions and
follow the rules you can earn a fair amount of money. During the experiment you can
earn additional amounts of money. In this experiment you earn points. These points will
be converted with a conversion rate of
100 points = 3 Euro.
Your …nal payo¤ consists of the initial 5 Euro given to you at the beginning of the
experiment and the money you earn in the course of the experiment. You will be paid
immediately after the experiment in cash.
16During the experiment communication is forbidden. If you have questions, please ask
us. We will gladly answer your questions individually. It is very important that you follow
this rule. Otherwise the results of the experiment will be of no value from a scienti…c
perspective.
Detailed instructions
Inthis experiment eachparticipant is abuyer. You andoneother buyerwill participate
in an auction in order to obtain units of a good. There are two possible outcomes. Either
you obtain one unit, or you obtain two units. If you obtain only one unit, this is of no
value for you. If you obtain two units, this will have a positive value for you. You will
be informed about your value of obtaining two units. This value is a number between 0
and 100. Your value of obtaining two units of the good is randomly determined such that
each number is equally likely to occur. This value is private information, i.e. neither you
know the other buyer’s value nor does the other buyer know your value.
The experiment consists of 3 practice periods and 40 trading periods. The practice pe-
riods will not account for your …nal earnings. But you should take these periods seriously
since you will gain valuable experience for the trading periods that are paid.
In each period you will participate in an auction with a second buyer. In each period
you are randomly matched with another buyer. You will never know whom you are
matched with and it may be that you are matched with somebody more often than once.
In each period you and every other buyer are assigned new values for obtaining two
units of the good. Notice that your value is very likely to be di¤erent from other buyers’
valuations.
The auction rules
The good is sold according to the following rules:
Each buyer is asked to submit a bid. This bid is the maximum amount the bidder is
willing to pay for one unit of the good. The buyer who submitted the higher bid is the
17winner and obtains two units of the good. The buyer who submits the lower bid obtains
only one unit.
For every unit you obtain you have to pay a price. This price equals the lower of the
two submitted bids. The price and your value determine what you earn.
If you are the winner, i.e. you have obtained 2 units, this has a positive value for you
but you have to pay the price for each of those units, i.e. you earn a number of points
equal to your value minus two times the price.
If you have obtained only 1 unit this is of no value for you but you have to pay the
price for this unit, i.e. you lose a number of points equal to the price.
Note that you can, dependent on the price and your value, make losses.
Example
The following examples shall help you to become familiar with the auction and the design
of the interface. You will …rst see the Decision Screen and then the Result Screen.
– Here the instructions contained a screenshot of the Decision Screen. –
In this case your valuation for obtaining two units of the good is 74. Your bid is 32.
Important:
If you do not submit a bid within the prespeci…ed time the computer will assign you a
bid of 0.
When the time is elapsed you will see the Result Screen. (Notice that the numbers
given in the screens serve illustrative purposes only.)
– Here the instructionscontained a screenshot of the Result Screen of a winner.
–
From the screen above you see that you submitted the highest bid. You obtain 2 units,
realize a value of 63 and you pay 2 times the price. Check that you earned 33 point.
– Here the instructions contained a screenshot of the Result Screen of a loser.
–
18Here you see that the other buyer submitted the winning bid and you obtain only 1
unit of the good. You do not realize your value of 68 but you have to pay the price for
one unit. Therefore you lose 30 points.
Good Luck!
Original Instructions were in German. These are instructions for
treatment SPSB.
General information for participants
You are taking part in an economics experiment funded by the Jubilaeumsfonds der
Oesterreichischen Nationalbank. The purpose of the experiment is to analyze decision
behavior in markets.
You will receive 5 Euro for showing up. If you carefully read the instructions and
follow the rules you can earn a fair amount of money. During the experiment you can
earn additional amounts of money. In this experiment you earn points. These points will
be converted with a conversion rate of
100 points = 3 Euro .
Your …nal payo¤ consists of the initial 5 Euro given to you at the beginning of the
experiment and the money you earn in the course of the experiment. You will be paid
immediately after the experiment in cash.
During the experiment communication is forbidden. If you have questions, please ask
us. We will gladly answer your questions individually. It is very important that you follow
this rule. Otherwise the results of the experiment will be of no value from a scienti…c
perspective.
19Detailed instructions
Inthis experiment eachparticipant is abuyer. You andoneother buyerwill participate
in an auction in order to obtain units of a good. There are two possible outcomes. Either
you obtain one unit, or you obtain two units. If you obtain only one unit, this is of no
value for you. If you obtain two units, this will have a positive value for you. You will
be informed about your value of obtaining two units. This value is a number between 0
and 100. Your value of obtaining two units of the good is randomly determined such that
each number is equally likely to occur. This value is private information, i.e. neither you
know the other buyer’s value nor does the other buyer know your value.
The experiment consists of 3 practice periods and 40 trading periods. The practice pe-
riods will not account for your …nal earnings. But you should take these periods seriously
since you will gain valuable experience for the trading periods that are paid.
In each period you will participate in an auction with a second buyer. In each period
you are randomly matched with another buyer. You will never know whom you are
matched with and it may be that you are matched with somebody more often than once.
In each period you and every other buyer are assigned new values for obtaining two
units of the good. Notice that your value is very likely to be di¤erent from other buyers’
valuations.
The auction rules
The good is sold according to the following rules:
Each buyer is asked to submit a bid. This bid is the maximum amount the bidder is
willing to pay for one unit of the good. The buyer who submitted the higher bid is the
winner and obtains two units of the good. The buyer who submits the lower bid obtains
only one unit.
For every unit the winner obtains, she has to pay a price. This price equals the lower
of the two submitted bids. The price and your value determine what you earn.
If you are the winner, i.e. you have obtained 2 units, this has a positive value for you
but you have to pay the price for each of those units, i.e. you earn a number of points
20equal to your value minus two times the price. Note that you can, dependent on the price
and your value, make losses.
If you have obtained only 1 unit this is of no value for you and you don’t have to pay
the price for this unit, i.e. your income in this period is equal to 0.
Example
The following examples shall help you to become familiar with the auction and the design
of the interface. You will …rst see the Decision Screen and then the Result Screen.
– Here the instructions contained a screenshot of the Decision Screen. –
In this case your valuation for obtaining two units of the good is 96. Your bid is 88.
Important:
If you do not submit a bid within the prespeci…ed time the computer will assign you a
bid of 0.
When the time is elapsed you will see the Result Screen. (Notice that the numbers
given in the screens serve illustrative purposes only.)
– Here the instructionscontained a screenshot of the Result Screen of a winner.
–
From the screen above you see that you submitted the highest bid. You obtain 2 units,
realize a value of 96 and you pay 2 times the price of 40. Check that you earned 16 point.
– Here the instructions contained a screenshot of the Result Screen of a loser.
–
Here you see that the other buyer submitted the winning bid and you obtain only 1
unit of the good. You do not realize your value of 68 and you don’t have to pay the price
for this unit. Therefore your income in this period is 0.
Good Luck!
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